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After gaining independence from Spain in the 1810s, Argentina underwent 
dramatic changes in its relationship to the world economic system and in its internal class 
structure. Perhaps nowhere were these changes so clear a s  in the province of Buenos 
Aires. From an entrepot engaged primarily in exporting Bolivian silver to Spain and 
importing European luxury goods from Spain, Buenos Aires became a major producer and 
exporter of hides and other cattle products, which went primarily to industrializing Britain. 
From a society dominated by merchants and royal bureaucrats, Buenos Aires developed a 
class structure dominated by large-scale ranchers and reinforced by an intensification of 
coercive control over the rural population. 
The association between peripheral status in the world system and coerced rural 
labor has been noted by Immanuel Wallerstein (1974, pp. 87-119), although the exact 
causal processes leading from incorporation in the world economy as an exporter of staple 
commodities to increased rural coercion remain rather obscure in Wallerstein's work. 
Wallerstein appears to see a kind of automatic correspondence between world system 
position and degree of coercion, which, as  Skocpol (1977) has pointed out, requires the 
assumption that the upper class can always get what it wants. Wallerstein's approach has 
also been challenged by Robert Brenner (1977), who asserts that landed upper classes are 
only able to expand production of export staples through increased coercion of rural labor 
where rural lower classes do not have the political, legal, and organizational resources 
necessary to stop them. Indeed, for Brenner, the rural lower classes may themselves take 
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advantage of expanded opportunities for export production, and thereby strengthen their 
position relative to the upper classes (1977, pp. 69-70, 88-90). 
Wallerstein also tends to treat what he calls "coerced cash-crop labor" as an 
undifferentiated phenomenon, although he does distinguish it from slavery. All of Latin 
America was peripheral to the world economy in the nineteenth century, but many 
different kinds of non-slave labor regime developed in the region (Duncan and Rutledge 
1977; Bauer 1979). Most of these labor regimes did involve some kind of coercion, but the 
nature and degree of coercive controls varied widely, and an approach which generalizes 
about the effects of different positions in the world system does not contribute to an  
understanding of this variation. 
This paper is an attempt to understand why certain specific. forms of coercion 
developed in Buenos Aires after independence. The fact that expanded production of export 
staples after independence involved major changes in the economic activities of the 
dominant classes makes it easier to trace the effects of increased export production on 
rural class relations. Although Buenos Aires was connected to the world economy during 
the colonial period, the nature of its relationship to the world system changed decisively 
with independence. Wallerstein expects coerced labor to be most prevalent in the 
production of export staples, and it was the production of export staples that increased 
dramatically after independence in Buenos Aires and came to dominate the economic life of 
the province (Wallerstein 1974, p. 91). Prior to the shift toward cattle production, the 
rural lower classes of Buenos Aires were also relatively free compared to their 
counterparts elsewhere in Latin America, particularly those in the plantation and mining 
regions that were central to the Spanish colonial economy (Garavaglia 1987, pp.51-2; 
Mayo 1984; Mayo and Latrubesse de Diaz unpublished; Salvatori unpublished). The 
expansion of cattle production in Buenos Aires, therefore, led to an actual intensification of 
rural coercion rather than simply the perpetuation of pre-existing patterns. 
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The approach adopted here does not assume that the upper classes were 
automatically able to obtain the coercive system which was most. convenient for them. In 
fact the forms of resistance available to the rural lower classes are treated here as  central 
to the explanation of both the nature of coercive laws and the ways in which these laws 
were implemented. This paper will argue that readily available opportunities for 
autonomous economic activity in early nineteenth century Buenos Aires made extra- 
economic coercion of the rural population a necessity if the dominant classes of the province 
were to have a labor force and be able to take advantage of the new opportunities for 
export production. The combination of highly seasonal labor demand with a mobile and 
armed population led to a strategy of indirect extra-economic coercion, in which rural elites 
used selective enforcement of repressive laws t~ increase the dependence of the rural 
, - population on them for protection from the state. This strategy was only partially 
- . . successful, however, and large ranchers obtained far less control over the rural population 
than they would have liked. Thus, although the world market presented an incentive for 
. .. the dominant classes of Buenos Aires to intensify rural coercion, the nature of coercive 
measures and the degree to which they could be implemented were shaped by local 
struggles, not the world system. 
Historical Background 
Prior to independence, the city of Buenos Aires was the capital and principal port of 
the Rio de la Plata viceroyalty, which included the area comprising present day Argentina, 
Uruguay, Paraguay, and Bolivia. The predominant activities of the city were thus 
administration and trade. The most important Buenos Aires merchants were involved in 
exporting Bolivian silver to Spain and importing European luxury goods from Spain for 
shipment by oxcart and mule to the silver-producing areas of Upper Peru (Bolivia) and 
intermediate points. (Halperin 1975; Socolow 1978, pp. 54-61. Although the countryside of 
Buenos Aires was well-suited for ranching, only a relatively narrow band of land along the 
Plate and Parana rivers was permanently occupied by Spaniards and most of the province 
was controlled by Amerindians (Halperin Donghi 196913). In general, ranchers possessed 
much less wealth, power, and prestige than the import-export merchants of the city (Azara 
1943, p. 7; Halperin 1969a, pp. 43-5; Socolow 1978, p. 65). Ranching expanded 
somewhat in the later years of the viceroyalty, due to the growing markets for hides in 
Europe and for salted meat in Brazil and Cuba, combined with intermittent Spanish 
permission to engage in direct trade with other European countries. Livestock products 
came to account for about a third of the value of the exports of Buenos Aires by the end of 
the colonial era (Halperin Donghi 1969a, p. 28). 
Independence brought the end of Spanish restrictions on trade and direct access to 
the market for hides of industrializing and war-making Western Europe, particularly that 
of Great Britain, which provided a strong stimulus to Argentine cattle production. At the 
same time, the war of independence caused the collapse of the silver trade when Buenos 
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Aires was cut off from Upper Peru (Bolivia). Many English merchants also moved to 
Buenos Aires and came to dominate the import trade (Ferns 1970; Halperh Donghi 1975). 
The mercantile upper classes of Buenos Aires thus found their -opportunities for trade 
greatly diminished a t  the same time that direct access to the world market provided 
opportunities for high rates of profit in cattle ranching, which increased dramatically after 
independence (Halperin Donghi 1969a). Post-independence governments responsive to the 
interests of large ranchers carried out various expeditions against the Indians that 
extended the frontier and increased the land area available for ranching (Halperin Donghi 
1969b; Zimmerman 1945). The provincial government of the early 1820s and the short- 
lived national government of the mid 1820s also gave out vast expanses of public land 
under the emphyteusis system, which provided for long term leases a t  very low rates 
(Bagu 1966; Coni 1927; Carretero 1970). Analysis of emphyteusis claims indicates that a 
vastly disproportionate amount of this land was claimed by urban wholesale merchants 
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(Monsma unpublished). Despite the dramatic economic and political changes of the 
independence period the core of the large-scale ranching class which came to dominate the 
province in the 1820s was comprised of families who had been among the wealthiest 
merchant families of the colony (Ansaldi 1985; Galmarini 1974, pp. 31-40; Halperin 
Donghi 1975). 
The Intensification of Rural Coercion 
The expansion of ranching after independence was accompanied by a series of 
repressive laws and decrees affecting the rural lower classes. The core of this set of laws 
was legislation requiring rural residents who did not own income-producing property to 
carry a paper certifying that they were employed. Those found without this document 
were to be considered vagrants and drafted into the military. Rural inhabitants traveling 
outside of their home district were also required to carry a passport authorized .by a Police 
Commissioner. Laws were passed banning the hunting of rheas (American ostriches) and 
restricting the hunting of other animals. Contact with the indians was severely limited, 
and rural general stores, or pulperias, were brought under strict regulation. Gambling and 
several traditional gaucho games were made illegal. Most of these laws had some kind of 
colonial antecedent, but the seriousness of enforcement efforts was unprecedented 
(Garavaglia 1987, pp. 51-2; Rodriguez Molas 1982, pp. 130, 137; Szuchman 1984, p. 85). 
Colonial vagrancy laws, in fact, seem to have been aimed more a t  the urban than the rural 
population and they were not used to restrict gaucho mobility until after independence 
(Salvatori unpublished, p. 13) To enforce these laws a system of rural Justices of the 
Peace and Police Commissioners was introduced to replace the colonial Alcaldes de 
Hermandad. The new system, which included local Alcaldes and Lieutenant Alcaldes 
answerable to the Justices of the Peace, and groups of armed men (partidus de policia) 
controlled by police commissioners, was supposed to allow closer surveillance of the 
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countryside and swift apprehension of delinquents (Diaz 1959; Halperin Donghi 1975, p. 
353; Romay 1980, pp. 81-7, 135-9). 
Like the vagrancy laws of eighteenth century Europe, the vagrancy laws and 
other restrictions on rural life in early nineteenth century Buenos Aires were partially 
intended to control crime and protect private property (Chambliss 1964; Foucault 1979; 
Thompson 1975). Livestock, the most important form of property in the province, was 
particularly vulnerable to theft. In Buenos Aires, however, these laws were also intended 
to force rural inhabitants to sell their labor. Labor shortage was a eonstant, problem for 
large ranchers, and official discourse repeatedly identified vagrancy with absence of work 
and production (Brown 1979, pp. 187-90; Halperin Donghi 19693, p. 49). A manual of 
instructions for Justices of the Peace referred to vagrants as "that class of men who 
produce nothing, who only live off the work of others, and are disposed to commit all types 
of crimes." (Manual pam 10s Jueces de Paz de Campana 1825, p. 22) The introduction to 
an 1822 decree ordering the police to arrest vagrants and remit them for military service 
called them "non-productive, costly, damaging to public morale, and instigators of 
disturbances (inquietudes) in the social order." This decree sunlmarized the need for police 
action with the statement "vagabonds are becoming a true obstacle to the country's 
progress" (Registro Oficial (Buenos Aires) 1822, pp. 170-1). To almost all members of the 
political elite a t  this time "progress" meant the expansion of the ranching economy. 
Why were coercive controls seen as  necessary to ensure an adequate supply of 
ranch labor, and why did coercive efforts take the form that they did? The answers to 
these questions require some knowledge of the rural social world into which the merchants- 
turned-ranchers were entering, and of the nature of cattle production a t  this time. In 
addition to smaller ranchers with legally recognized land titles, the countryside abounded 
with small settlers who did not possess any kind of official title to the land they used. In 
colonial Buenos Aires, legal procedures for obtaining land titles required so much money 
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and influence that many small ranchers and farmers simply set up operations as  squatters 
a t  appropriate locations on the vast plains (Azara 1943, pp. 13-4; Giberti 1970, pp. 45-8; 
Rodriguez Molas 1982). Colonial sources also indicate the presence of many small settlers 
using land belonging to large landholders with their permission. In exchange, these 
settlers, known as agregados, paid rent, provided labor services, or assured the limits of the 
landowner's property against encroachment by neighboring ranchers (Mayo 1987, p. 28; 
Amaral 1987, p. 35; Garavaglia 1987, pp. 45-6). With easy access to land, barriers to 
entry into ranching were low. Cattle, the largest initial expense of ranching, were cheap 
and multiplied naturally (Halperin Donghi 1969a, p. 35). 
Squatting continued into the early national period and may have increased with the 
expansion of the frontier to the south (Garcia 1969, p. 22). Under the emphyteusis 
system of the 1820s, wealthy individuals claimed much land that was already occupied by 
squatters (Carretero 1974, pp. 97-8; Coni 1927, p. 46; Gonzalez Bernaldo 1987, pp. 144- 
5). The emphyteusis system does not seem to have severely restricted access to land, 
however, as many of these squatters were apparently turned into agregados or renters. 
The cattle brand registry maintained by the police indicates that, by 1830,' large numbers 
of those with registered brands were using land possessed by others (Coleccion general de 
las marcas del ganado de la Provincia de Buenos Aires 1830). Land was a superabundant 
resource relative to other economic inputs, and the possession of large expanses of land did 
not allow the dominant classes of the province to monopolize cattle production or ensure the 
availability of an economically dependent labor force. 
In addition to small-scale ranching and farming, a variety of other autonomous 
economic activities were available to the rural lower classes. These included charcoal 
making, the hunting of rheas for feathers and nutrias for pelts, and the slaughter of stray 
and stolen cattle, which provided both hides and food. Although some of these activities 
were carried out partly for subsistence, all of them also involved production for domestic or 
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international markets. The products were often sold to the owners of pulperias, who 
provided an avenue for commercialization of pampean products which was independent of 
the large ranchers (Brown 1979, pp.142-3; Halperin Donghi 1969a, pp. 48-9; Mayo 1987, 
p.27). Elite complaints about the non-productive nature of the rural lower classes thus 
seem to have been motivated more by the difficulty of finding reliable ranch peons than by 
an actual absence of productive activity on the part of rural inhabitants. In fact, the labor 
shortage was caused in part by the fact that the rural lower classes were already engaged 
in independent commodity production. Readily available opportunities for subsistence and 
petty commodity production meant that economic compulsion to work for others was 
particularly weak in early nineteenth century Buenos Aires. The ease of autonomous 
existence was accompanied by a culture of independence and disrespect for social hierarchy 
that made reliable ranch peons even more difficult to find (Mayo 1984; Mayo 1987; 
Salvatori and Brown 1987). 
Not only was it easy for the rural lower classes to get by without selling their 
labor, but the nature of ranching a t  the time meant that it would have been difficult or 
impossible for large ranchers to offer economic incentives strong enough to ensure a 
dependable labor force as  long as  the rural lower classes had access to land. Economies of 
scale in ranching were such that small ranchers were just as  productive as large ranchers 
in this era. The available evidence indicates that highly concentrated landholdings were 
not necessary or optimal for cattle production. The actual unit of production was 
considerably smaller than the unit of landholding, with large ranches divided into several 
smaller subranches with separate herds and separate sets of peons attending them 
(Halperin 1969b, p. 66). There were technical limits to the size of the unit of production in 
this pre-fence era because herds above a certain size were difficult to tame and difficult to 
round up. I t  was also difficult to separate the stray cattle of neighbors from large herds 
(Leme'e 1942, p.116). In a free labor market, a s  Brenner has noted, landlords cannot 
afford to pay workers who are able to produce the same commodities with an equal degree 
of productivity by themselves. The producers would be better off working for themselves 
unless capitalists were willing to pay them the full value of their products, in which case 
the capitalists would be left without profits (Brenner 1986, p. 31). The beginnings of such 
a situation were already noticeable in Buenos Aires before independence. The Alcalde de 
Hermandad of Chascomus wrote in 1808 that his district was 
... filled with vagrants and other individuals who, having a herd of mares and ten or 
twelve branded horses, already consider themselves ranchers (hacendados) ... (T)he 
few animals they have graze on land that does not belong to them ... (They) live off 
the cattle of others, live without any kind of subordination, do not dedicate 
themselves to any work with which they could earn a living ... (0)ne sees the 
ranchers filled with anguish in their work because they cannot find any peons' 
willing to work (conchabarse) (Facultad de Filosofia y Letras, Universidad de 
Buenos Aires 1914, p.193). 
Settlers with small herds could always find time to work for others by leaving their 
animals and fields in the care of other family members, but the nature of ranching a t  this 
time meant that they had a strong incentive, other things being equal, to let the size of 
their herds increase and gradually withdraw from wage labor. The necessary land could 
be obtained easily enough through renting or through informal occupancy of frontier land. 
If large ranchers were to have workers, it was important that the rural lower classes be 
prevented from themselves taking advantage of the new opportunities for export 
production. 
Why not simply require the rural lower classes to perform labor services for 
landowners? This solution would have encountered special problems in the ecological and 
social environment of rural Buenos Aires. The mobility of a population on horseback 
combined with the vastness of the plains and the ease of autonomous subsistence to 
facilitate escape, or "exit", from undesirable social circumstances (see Hirschman 1970). 
In his report to the revolutionary Junta after inspecting the countryside of Buenos Aires in 
1811, Pedro Andrds Garcia noted the difficulty of controlling this population: "The wisest 
laws, the most rigorous police measures, will never work on a population dispersed over an 
immense countryside, and on families that can move their homes with the same facility as 
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Arabs or Pampas (Indians)" (1969, p. 23). Not only was there a n  open frontier, but the 
Indians on the other side of the frontier often welcomed refugees from Hispanic society 
(Mayo and Latrubesse de Diaz unpublished). Later on in the same report Garcia stated 
"(M)any of our country-folk, whose customs ... are not very far from those of the savages, 
have become acquainted with them, and attracted by the desire to live a life of ease, or 
perhaps fearing punishment for their crimes, gladly settle among the Indians." (Garcia 
1969, p. 35-36). Cattle production also required that peons work autonomously and be 
skilled in the use of dangerous weapons, which made direct coercion even more difficult. 
Directly coerced labor in the form of slaves was often used on large ranches, where 
small numbers of slaves served as permanent, year-round workers (Albores et  al. 1977; 
Amaral 1987a; Mayo 1987, p. 30). The bulk of ranch work, however, was concentrated in 
the seasonal tasks of roundup and branding, which occurred in the spring and the fall, and 
it would have been prohibitively expensive to buy and maintain slaves who were only used 
for a few months of the year (Amaral 1987a, pp. 261-3). In any case, slaves could easily 
escape in the frontier environment of Buenos Aires. Although ranch owners developed 
paternalistic relationships with the few slaves who worked on large ranches, the rural 
police filed many reports of runaway slaves during this period. Such paternalism might 
have broken down completely if slaves had been used as  the bulk of the ranch labor force. 
As I have shown above, both economic and direct extra-economic coercion of labor 
were not very feasible in rural Buenos Aires after independence. The coercive controls 
imposed on the rural population were therefore oriented toward restricting possibilities for 
autonomous existence and depressing the price of labor. Vagrancy laws put pressure on 
rural inhabitants to sell their labor. Passport requirements restricted mobility, thereby 
limiting possibilities for "exit" and restricting the operation of a free labor market. 
Restrictions on hunting penalized an important form of petty commodity production. 
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Restrictions on pulperias and on contact with the Indians were an attempt to control 
autonomous commercialization networks. 
The prohibition of traditional forms of leisure is more mysterious. In an 
environment in which economic compulsion to work for others was weak, and in which one 
could get by with very little work a t  all, elites sometimes considered the simple availability 
of distractions a disincentive to work. This is clearly expressed in various prohibitions on 
horse races and attendance a t  general stores on workdays. Opposition to traditional games 
and amusements was often stronger than this, however. Rural elites sometimes associated 
traditional entertainments with extreme harm, as  when the Alcalde de Hermandad of San 
Vicente called those who played card games in pulperias "vice-ridden malevolent 
perpetrators of death and robbery" who, if not controlled, would cause "the total ruin of our 
estates (haciendas)" (to Substitute Governor, August 29, 1820, in Archivo General de la 
Nacibn, Buenos Aires (henceforth AGN) X-11-8-9 Comandantes y Alcaldes de Campaiia, 
etc. 1820). Games and amusements allowed the formation of horizontal bonds among. 
rural men, who lived and worked in isolation or in small groups. Most of these leisure time 
activities- drinking, gambling, story telling, horseracing, and other equestrian contests and 
games- took place in or around the pulperias (Rodriguez Molas 1982, p. 144; Slatta 1983, 
pp. 80-87). Elite discussions of these general stores centered on the violence and 
"disturbances" that took place there (Bossio 1972, pp. 65-96). Many such "disturbances" 
were simply fights between gamblers, but pulperias also became important centers of 
political agitation and organizing during times of rural unrest (Bossio 1972, pp. 86-91; 
Gonzglez Bernaldo 1987, p. 149). It  is therefore reasonable to think that the banning of 
gaucho entertainments and the stricter regulation of country stores were motivated in part 
by a desire to restrict the capacity of the rural population for collective action. 
Coercive Controls in Action 
On the surface, the coercive controls imposed on the rural population of Buenos 
Aires after independence were a straightforward attempt to control disorder and force rural 
men to sell their labor. The actual enforcement of these laws was more complex, however. 
They were vague enough that it would have been possible to define the majority of the 
rural population as  vagrants or criminals. The seasonality of ranch work meant that most 
ranch workers were unemployed for much of the year and that "vagrants" and ranch 
peons were often the same people (Mayo 1984, p. 616). Large ranchers thus did not want 
the complete elimination of opportunities for autonomous subsistence. Overly zealous rural 
authorities who tried to enforce the letter of the law found themselves frustrated by the 
obstruction of prominent citizens and the tendency of many ranchers to let the poor settle 
on their land (JP of Monte to Minister of Government, March 13, 1827, J P  of Magdalena 
to Minister of Government, March 11, 1827, both in AGN X-14-7-5 Tribunal de Justicia, 
Jueces de Paz 1827; J P  of Capilla del Carmen to Chief of Police, May 4, 1825, in AGN X- 
35-1 1-13 Policia, Partes de campaiia 1825). The same Alcalde de Hermandad who was 
determined to stamp out card games complained that someone always exercised influence 
to have the prisoners he remitted set free (Alcalde de Hermandad of San Vicente to 
Substitute Governor, August 29, 1820, in AGN X-11-8-9 Comandantes y Alcaldes de 
Campaiia, etc. 1820). During periods of particularly intense military conflict, when the 
state moved toward strict enforcement of vagrancy laws to supply soldiers to the army, 
large ranchers protested bitterly about the impressment of their workers (see, e.g. AGN X- 
13-9-4 Justicia 1826; AGN X-14-7-5 Tribunal de Justicia, Jueces de Paz 1827; Rodriguez 
Molas 1982, pp. 131-132, 150-151). 
In practice the various forms of coercive law introduced or reinforced after 
independence were used to break down horizontal networks among the rural lower classes 
and to reinforce vertical ties of patronage and dependency. Repressive laws were 
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selectively enforced, which promoted dependence on rural elites for protection from the 
state. The definition of who was a vagrant was left to the discretion of rural authorities, 
who were drawn from rural elites and often arrested individuals a t  the request of other 
local notables. Bernardo Ferreira, for example, was arrested in 1827 for being "a vagrant, 
and disobedient to the masters he came here to serve, who have complained to this judge." 
(JP of Guardia de Lujan to Chief of Police, Aug. 7, 1827, in AGN X-32-11-2 Policia (Libro 
27), Partes de campafia 1827, No. 70). Individuals who were supported by members of 
the local elite willing to attest to their good character were generally not arrested for 
vagrancy. The vagrancy laws and other coercive controls over the rural population were 
just one part  of a criminal justice system affected at all levels by influence-peddling and 
clientelism (Szuchman 1984, pp. 102-5). Like selectively applied capital punishment in 
eighteenth century England (Hay 1975), selectively enforced vagrancy laws fostered 
dependence on the benevolence of rural elites, thereby strengthening the rather weak 
patron-client bonds between large ranchers and the rural population. 
Notes from rural authorities accompanying individuals remitted for vagrancy 
indicate how these individuals became defined as  vagrants. Most of them were not 
arrested for vagrancy alone. Rural authorities generally stated that  those remitted were 
vagrants and guilty or suspected of committing some other crime such a s  cattle theft, 
desertion from the military, carrying a knife in public, gambling, public intoxication, 
fighting, or insulting authorities. Many of those arrested for vagrancy were not accused of 
a specific criminal incident, but were labelled "a known thief' or simply "undesirable" 
(perjudicial). During times of rural unrest, many of the vagrants were also "suspicious" or 
"insolent" or had "disturbed public order". In  practice vagrancy laws allowed rural 
authorities greater latitude and flexibility in the enforcement of order and discipline in the 
countryside. Those who were suspected of crimes, but against whom there was no 
evidence, and those who were guilty of uncodified offenses could still be arrested for 
vagrancy. The unemployed were not automatically classified a s  vagrants, but they were 
arrested if they refused to seek work when ordered to do so. In 1825, Lino Sanchez and 
Mateo Correa were placed a t  the disposition of the Chief of Police because "they have been 
warned to either enlist in the police patrol or look for a master, and be contracted, and they 
have ignored the warning on various occasions" (Police Commissioner of San Vicente to 
Chief of Police, Aug. 31, 1825, in AGN X-35-11-13 Policia, Partes de campaiia 1825). A 
frequent justification for considering someone a vagrant was "nobody knows him in these 
parts." Jos6 Caravallo, for example, was remitted in 1827 "for being found with a knife, 
without a work contract, and being unknown" (Police Commissioner of San Isidro to Chief 
of Police, Feb. 24, 1827, in AGN X-32-11-1 Policl'a (Libro 26), Partes de campaiia 1827, 
No. 99). Not having a local patron was thus treated as  if it were a crime in itself. 
The  Limits of Rural Coercion 
Were the dominant classes of the province able to successfully subjugate the rural 
population? Only partially. Rural authorities repeatedly complained of their inability to 
adequately patrol the vast plains, of rural inhabitants who sheltered fugitives and rescued 
prisoners, of desertions by their own men (e.g. AGN X-13-8-6 Justicia 1825; Registro 
Oficial (Buenos Aires) 1822, pp. 209-11). Escape from custody was common. A report 
filed by the Lieutenant Alcalde of Puerto de Zarate a t  the end of 1825 indicates that, of the 
22 individuals he had arrested and sent in to be processed by superiors that year, a t  least 
5 had managed to escape before reaching their destination (Dec. 28, 1825, in AGN X-35- 
11-13 Policia, Partes de campaiia 1825). Enforcing the law was particularly difficult on 
the sparsely populated plains south of the Salado River (JP of Monsalvo to Chief of Police, 
Feb. 15, 1826, in AGN X-13-9-4 Justicia 1826). 
Mercy and selective application of laws were useful for building patron-client ties 
between large ranchers and the rural lower classes, but it should not be assumed that all 
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omissions in the application of the law resulted from the paternalism of the dominant 
classes. The implementation of vagrancy laws was also limited by what James Scott 
(1985) calls "everyday forms of resistance". The balance between resistance and official 
violence was continually shifting, and small scale acts of resistance posing a serious threat 
to the lives and property of individual members of the rural elite were common enough to 
motivate authorities to reach some accommodation with the local population. Unlike the 
wealthiest ranchers and merchants, who lived in the capital city, the Justices of the Peace 
and Alcaldes lived in the countryside and had to face the rural population in person. Rural 
authorities may have feared becoming favored targets for the small-scale cattle theft that 
was an  everyday fact of life on the plains. Fear for personal safety also influenced their 
behavior. On the pampas of early nineteenth century Buenos Aires, where the lower 
classes were highly mobile and skilled in the use of knives, lances, and bolas, and the 
forces of order were spread thin, fear for personal safety may have been the most 
compelling reason of all to carry out the duties of Justice of the Peace or Alcalde with some 
discretion. Correspondence received by the provincial Chief of Police includes several 
reports of Alcaldes and members of police patrols being attacked by individuals they were 
attempting to arrest (e.g. communications from JP of Flores, July 2, 1825, and J P  of 
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Magdalena, July 25, 1825, both in AGN X-35-11-13 Policia, Partes de campafia 1825; 
from Police Commissioner of Monsalvo, June 29, 1828, in AGN X-32-11-4 Policia (Libro 
31), Partes de campafia 1828). Such restrictions on the activity of J P s  were probably the 
underlying reason for frequent complaints from police commissioners to their superiors 
about the laxity of Justices of the Peace and complaints by new Justices of the Peace about 
the state of affairs left by their predecesors (e.g. AGN X-13-8-6 Justicia 1825). 
After almost a decade of the new rural police system, the capacity of the rural 
lower classes for collective action seemed just a s  strong a s  ever. Rural rebellion and 
banditry peaked during the civil war of 1828-29, which also provided a n  opportunity for 
settling scores with unpopular rural elites (Diaz 1959, pp. 123-4; Gonzilez Bernardo 
1987). The J P  of Navarro reported in 1829 that "the bandits entered my ranch, and not 
only did they amuse themselves 'by not leaving me a single horse, they even chased me for 
eight leagues trying to kill me" (JP of Navarro to Minister of Government, March 17, 
1829, in AGN X-15-3-1 Justicia, Jueces de Paz 1829). The difficulty of imposing order on 
the rural population, particularly their autonomous participation in the civil war of 1828- 
29, suggests that the dominant class of the province was willing to support the dictatorship 
of Juan Manuel de Rosas after 1830 partly because, due to his popularity among the rural 
lower classes, he was the only person capable of controlling an unruly countryside. 
Although the position of large ranchers improved under Rosas, not even the b s a s  regime 
could always maintain rural discipline. In 1832, for example, the J P  of ChascomLis 
reported to Rosas that his district was "infested" with "vagrants and ne'er-do-wells (vagos 
y ma1 entretenidos)" and that some cattle thieves were operating with impunity there (Feb. 
10, 1832, in AGN X-20-10-7 Juzgado de Paz, ChascomGs 1828-1852). 
Conclusions 
Although the changing nature of Buenos Aires's relationship the world system in 
the early nineteenth century provided the upper classes of the province with a strong 
incentive to increase rural coercion, the nature of this coercion cannot be derived from the 
position of Buenos Aires in the world system. To understand the coercive laws of this 
period and the forms and limits of their application it has been necessary to examine a t  a 
more micro level the ecological and social environment in which the production of export 
staples took place, the ways in which these commodities were produced, and the 
experiences and struggles of those involved in producing them. The position of Buenos 
Aires in the world-system was crucial, but it is only the beginning of the story. 
This paper has shown that both the juridical forms and the actual application of 
coercion in Buenos Aires after independence were strongly influenced by the possibilities 
for autonomous existence of, and the forms of resistence available to, the rural population, 
which were in turn shaped by the availability of open land and the existing technology of 
cattle production. Because large ranchers could not monopolize access to land, they could 
not rely on economic necessity to force the rural population to work for them, and equal 
levels of productivity among small and large producers rendered the use of economic 
incentives ineffective. The capacity for violence of the rural population and the availability 
of "exit" from undesirable social relationships prevented the direct imposition of labor 
obligations, and the seasonal nature of ranch work meant that ruthless repression of 
alternatives to wage labor was not feasible either. Large ranchers and rural authorities 
therefore attempted to manipulate repressive laws to increase the dependence of the rural 
lower classes on them for protection from state power and to strengthen patron-client ties. 
This strategy met with only partial success in the first half of the nineteenth century, 
however, a s  the rural lower classes retained considerable capacity for both individual and 
collective resistance, which tended to frustrate efforts to make them dependent on the 
benevolence of rural elites for protection. 
This analysis indicates the need for a distinction between direct and indirect extra- 
economic coercion in addition to the commonly used distinction between economic and 
extra-economic coercion (Anderson 1974; Moore 1966; Wolf 1982). These forms of labor 
control are not mutually exclusive, and may occur in varying combinations. Although 
direct extra-economic coercion probably allows a higher degree of exploitation than indirect 
extra-economic coercion, the latter has some important ideological advantages for dominant 
classes. By displacing resistance to coercion from its principal beneficiaries to the state, 
indirect extra-economic coercion allows dominant classes to present themselves a s  
protectors of the poor. 
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Dominant classes are particularly likely to rely on indirect extra-economic coercion 
to ensure an adequate supply of labor in situations where, as  in early nineteenth century 
Buenos Aires, other options are excluded or severely restricted. Such a situation seems 
particularly likely to obtain when export staples requiring low levels of capital investment 
are produced in a context of frontier abundance. Indirect extra-economic coercion was not 
the only possible labor regime under which production of export staples would have been 
possible in post-colonial Buenos Aires. The most obvious alternative would have been 
expanded production of export staples by small settlers. In fact, it was partly to prevent 
this alternative that the dominant classes of the province used their political power to 
impose coercive controls on the rural population. 
The tenuous situation of large ranchers in the early decades of the nineteenth 
century indicates that the expansion of ranching under the control of the dominant. classes 
of the province was far from an automatic response to change in the relationship of Buenos 
Aires to the world system. The benefits gained through intensified rural coercion and 
domination of access to the world market in this period enabled the landed upper class to 
gradually reinforce its position. This landed oligarchy would shape subsequent Argentine 
history in crucial ways. Their power and the coercive methods with khich they maintained 
their position can be seen as  restricting possibilities for more egalitarian political and 
economic development for most of a century. 
References 
Albores, Oscar, Carlos A. Mayo, and Judith L. Sweeney. 1977. "Esclavos y conchabados 
en la Estancia de Santa Catalina, Co'rdoba (1764-1771)." Revista America No 5. 
Amaral, Samuel. 1987a. "Rural Production and Labour in Late Colonial Buenos Aires." 
Journal of Latin American Studies 19:235-78. 
Amaral, Samuel. 1987b. "Trabajo y trabajadores rurales en Buenos Aires a fines del siglo 
XVIII." Anuario. Instituto de Estudios Histdrico-Sociales (Tandil, Argentina) 2:33-41. 
Anderson, Perry. 1974. Lineages of the Absolutist S U .  London: New Left Books. 
Ansaldi, Waldo. 1985. "Notas sobre la formaci6n de la burguesia argentina, 1780- 1880." 
Pp. 515-83 in Or i~enes  v desarrollo de la burguesia en AmCrica Latina, 1700-1955, 
edited by Enrique Florescano. Mexico City: Nueva Imagen. 
Azara, Felix de. 1943 (1847). Memoria sobre el estado rural del Rio de la Plata y otros 
infcrmes. Buenos Aires: Bajel. 
Bagu, Sergio. 1966. El plan econ6mico del g u p o  Rivadaviano (18 11- 1827), Rosario: 
Universidad Nacional del Litoral. 
Bauer, Arnold J. 1979. "Rural Workers in Spanis'h America: Problems of Peonage and 
Oppression." Hispanic American Historical Review 59:34-63. 
Bossio, Jorge A. 1972. Historia de las pulperia. Buenos Aires: Plus Ultra. 
Brenner, Robert. 1977. "The Origins of Capitalist Development: a Critique of Neo-Smithian 
Marxism." New Left Review 104:25-92. 
Brenner, Robert. 1986. "The Social Basis of Economic Development." Pp. 32-77 in 
Analytical Marxism, edited by John Roemer. Cambridge and Paris: Cambridge 
University Press and Maison des Sciences de 1'Homme. 
Brown, Jonathan C. 1979. A Socioeconomic Historv of Argentina. 1776-1860. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Carretero, Andre's M. 1970. "Contribuci6n al conocimiento de la propiedad rural en la 
provincia de Buenos Aires para 1830." Boletin del Instituto de Historia A r ~ e n t i n a  
II tor Emilio Ravimani" 13(segunda serie no.22-23):246-92. 
Carretero, Andre's M. 1974. Origenes de la dependencia econo'mica argentina Buenos 
Aires: Platero. 




lon ~ e n e r a l  - de las marcas del w a d 0  de la Provincia de Buenos .Aires. 1830. Buenos 
Aires: Bacle y Compaiiia. 
re la enfiteusis de R Coni, Emilio A. 1927. La verdad sob ivadavia Buenos Aires: Imprenta 
de la Universidad. 
Paz de Campa" Diaz, Benito. 1959. Juzeados de na de la Provincia de Buenos Aires (182 1- 
1854). La Plata, Argentina: Universidad Nacional de La Plata. 
Duncan, Kenneth, and Ian Rutledge. 1977. "Introduction: Patterns of Agrarian Capitalism 
in Latin America." Pp. 1-20 in Land and Labor in Latin America edited by Kenneth 
Duncan and Ian Rutledge. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Facultad de Filosofia y Letras (Universidad de Buenos Aires). 1914. Documentos para l a  
historia argentina, Vol. 4, Abasto de la ciudad v campafia de Buenos Aires (1773- 
18091. Buenos Aires: Compaiiia Sud-Americana de Billetes de Banco. 
Ferns, H. S. 1960. Britain and Argentina in the Nineteenth Century, London: Oxford 
University Press. 
Foucault, Michel. 1979. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, New York: 
Vintage. 
Galmarini, Hugo Raul. 1974. Nerrocios v politica en la epoca de Rivadavia, Buenos Aires: 
Platero. 
Garavaglia, Juan Carlos. 1987.  e ex is tier on 10s gauchos?" Anuario. Instituto de Estudios 
Histdrico-Sociales (Tandil, Argentina) 2:42-52. 
Garcia Belsunce, CQsar A. e t  al. 1976. Buenos Aires. 1800-1830, Vol. 1, Su rrente. Buenos 
Aires: Emece. 
Giberti, Horacio C. E. 1970. Historia econdmica de la ganaderia ar~ent ina,  Buenos Aires: 
Ediciones Solar. 
Gonzilez Bernaldo, Pilar. 1987. "El levantamiento de 1829: El imaginario social y sus 
implicaciones politicas en un conflicto rural." Anuario. Instituto de Estudios Histdrico- 
Sociales (Tandil, Argentina) 2: 137-76. 
Halperin Donghi, Tulio. 1969a. "La expansion ganadera en la campaiia de Buenos Aires 
(1810-1852)." Pp. 21-73 in Los fragmentos del ~oder :  De la oli~arquia a la ~ o l i a r q u k  
argentina, edited by Torcuato S. Di Tella and Tulio Halperin Donghi. Buenos Aires: 
Editorial Jorge Alvarez. 
Halperin Donghi, Tulio. 196913. "La expansib de la frontera de Buenos Aires (1810- 
1852)." Pp. 77-91 in Tierras nuevas, edited by Alvaro Jara. Mexico City: El Colegio de 
MBxico. 
Halperin Donghi, Tulio. 1975. Politics. Economics and Societv in Arrrentina in the 
Revolutionarv Period. London: Cambridge University Press. 
Hay, Douglas. 1975. "Property, Authority, and the Criminal Law." Pp. 17-63 in Albion's 
Fatal Tree: Crime and Societv in Eighteenth Centurv England, edited by Douglas Hay, 
et al. New York: Pantheon. 
Hirschman, Albert 0. 1970. .Exit. Voice. and Lovalty: Responses to Decline in Firms. 
Qrganizations. and States. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press. 
Lem&e, Carlos. 1942. "Comentarios a las 'instrucciones'." Pp. 67-120 in lnstrucciones a 103 
Mavordomos de Estancias, by Juan  Manuel de Rosas. Buenos Aires: Editorial 
Americana. 
Manual para 10s Jueces de Paz de Campaiia, 1825. Buenos Aires: Imprenta de la 
Independencia. 
Mavo, Carlos A. 1984. "Estancia y peonaje en la regio'n pampeana en la segunda mitad del 
siglo XVIII." Pesarrollo Economico 23:609-16. 
Mayo, Carlos A. 1987. "Sobre peones, vagos y malentretenidos: el dilema de la economia 
rural rioplatense durante la epoca colonial." Anuario. Instituto de Estudios Histdrico- 
Sociales (Tandil, Argentina) 2:25-32. 
Mayo, Carlos A. and Amalia Latrubesse de Diaz. unpublished. "Sociedad, tierra y vida en 
la frontera bonaerense (1 736- 18 15)." 
Monsma, Karl. unpublished (work in progress). "From Merchants to Landlords: the 
Transformation of the Dominant Class in Post-Colonial Buenos Aires." 
Moore, Barrington J r .  1966. Social Orisjns of Dictatorship and Democracv: Lord and 
Peasant in the ma kin^ of the Modern World. Boston: Beacon Press. 
Oddone, Jacinto. 1976 (2nd ed.). La  burguesia terrateniente argentina, Buenos Aires: 
Ediciones Libera. 
R e ~ s t r o  Oficial (Buenos Aires) 1822. Buenos Aires: Imprenta de la Independencia. 
Rodriguez Molas, Ricardo. 1982 (1968). Historia social del ~ a u c h o .  Buenos Aires: Centro 
Editor de Ame'rica Latina. 
Romay, Francisco L. 1980. Historia de la Policia Federal A r ~ e n t i n a  Tomo II. 1820-1830, 
Buenos Aires: Editorial Policial. I 
Salvatori, Ricardo, and Jonathan C. Brown. 1987. "Trade and Proletarianization in Late 
Colonial Banda Oriental: Evidence from the Estancia de las Vacas." &panic 
American Historical Review 67(3). 
Salvatori, Ricardo. unpublished. "Gaucho Autonomy and the Breakdown of Social 
Discipline in Banda Oriental and the Litoral, 1780-1830." 
Scott, James C. 1986. Weapons of the Weak: Evervdav Forms of Peasant Resistance. New 
Haven and London: Yale University Press. 
Skocpol, Theda. 1977. "Wallerstein's World Capitalist System: A Theoretical and 
Historical Critique." A me r' ican Journal of Sociolog 82: 1075-90. 
Slatta, Richard W. 1980. "Rural Criminality and Social Conflict in Nineteenth-Century 
Buenos Aires Province." Hi spa ni c American Historical Rev iew 60(3):450-72. 
Slatta, Richard W. 1983. Gauchos and the Vanishing Frontier, Lincoln, Nebraska: 
University of Nebraska Press. 
Socoiow, Susan Migden. 1978. The Merchants of Buenos Aires 1778-1810: Familv a n d  
commerce. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Szuchman, Mark D. 1984. "Disorder and Social Control in Buenos Aires, 1810-1860." 
Journal of Interdisciplinarv History 15(1):83-110. 
Thompson, Edward P. 1975. Whigs and Hunters: The Origin of the Black Act. New York: 
Random House. 
.allerstein, Immanuel. 1974. The Modern World-System: Ca~ital is t  Ag-riculture and the 
Origins of the European World-Economv in the Sixteenth Centurv. New York: 
Academic Press. 
Wolf, Eric R. 1982. Europe and the Peo~ le  Without History. Berkeley: University of 
California Press. 
Zimmerman, -4. F. 1945. The Land Policy of Argentina, with Particular Reference to the 
Conquest of the Southern Pampas." Bis~anic  American Historical Review 25(1):3-26. 
PROGRAM ON THE 
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF SOCIAL TRANSFORMATIONS 
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN 
The Program on the Comparative Study of Social Transformations is an inter- 
disciplinary research program at the University of Michigan. Its faculty 
associates are drawn primarily from the departments of Anthropology, History, 
and Sociology, but also include members of several other programs in the 
humanities and social sciences. Its mission is to stimulate new inter- 
disciplinary thinking and research about all kinds of social transformations 
in.a wide range of present and past societies. CSST Working Papers report 
current research by faculty and graduate student associates of the program; 
many will be published elsewhere after: revision. Working Papers are available 
for a fee of $1.00 for papers under 40 pages and for $2.00 for longer papers. 
The program will photocopy out-of-print Working Papers at cost ($,05 per 
page.) TO request copies of Working Papers, write to Comparative Study of 
Social Transformationsr 4010 LSA- Building, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 
MI 48109-1382 or call (313) 936-1595. 
"Program in Comparative Study of Social Transformations," by William H. 
Sewell, Jr., Terrence J. McDonald, Sherry B. Ortner, and Jeffery M. 
Paige, May 1987, 15 pages. Also CRSO Working Paper #344. 
"Labor History, Uneven Development, and the Autonomy of Politics: The 
Dockworkers of Nineteenth-Century Marseille," by William H. Sewell, Jr., 
July 1987, 45 pages. Also CRSO Working Paper #346. 
"Coffee, Copper, and Class Conflict in Central America and Chile: A 
Critique of Zeitlin's Civil Wars in Chile and Zeitlin and Ratcliff's' 
Landlords and Capitalistsr" by Jeffery M. Paige, September 1987, 10 
pages. Also CRSO Working Paper #347. 
"In Search of the Bourgeois Revolution: The Particularities of German 
History," by Geoffrey Eley, September 1987, 61 pages. Also CRSO working 
Paper #350. 
"The Burdens of Urban History: The Theory of the State in Recent 
American Social History," by Terrence McDonald, May 1988, 50 pages. 
Also CRSO Working Paper #355. 
"History, Sociology, and Theories of Organization," by Mayer N. Zald, 
May 1988, 42 pages. Also CRSO Working Paper #357, 
"Have Social Historians Lost the Civil War? Some Preliminary 
Demographic Speculations," by Maris A. Vinovskis, May 1988, 55 pages. 
Also CRSO Working Paper #358. 
"Revolution and the Agrarian Bourgeoisie in Nicaragua," by Jeffery M, 
Paige, 42 pages. Also CRSO Working Paper 11363. 
"Nationalism and Class as Factors in the Revolution of 1917," by Ronald 
G. Suny, October 1988, 42 pages. Also CRSO Working Paper 11365. 
10 "The O r i g i n a l  Caste: Power, His tory ,  and Hierarchy i n  South Asia," by 
Nicholas  B. Dirks ,  October 1988, 30 pages. Also CRSO Working Paper 
#367. 
11 "The Invent ion  of Caste:  C i v i l  Soc ie ty  i n  Colonia l  Ind ia , "  by Nicholas 
B. Di rks ,  October 1988, 24 pages. Also CRSO Working Paper #368. 
1 2  "Sociology a s  a Di sc ip l ine :  Quasi-Science and Q u a s i - H m n i t i e s , "  by 
Mayer Zald,  October 1988, 43  pages. A l s o  CRSO Working Paper #369. 
13 "Cons t r a in t s  on P ro fe s s iona l  Power i n  Soviet-Type Society:  I n s i g h t s  
from t h e  S o l i d a r i t y  Period i n  Poland," by Michael Do Kennedy and Konrad 
Sadkowski, November 1988, 37 pages- Also CRSO Working Paper #371. 
CENTER FOR RESEARCH ON SOCIAL ORGANIZATION 
WORKING PAPER SERIES 
CRSO Working Papers report current research and reflection by affiliates of 
.the Center. Working papers which are still in print are available for a fee of 
$2.00 for any paper under 100 pages and $4.00 for papers over 100 pages. The 
Center will photocopy out-of-print working papers at cost (five cents per page). 
To request copies of working papers, or for further information about the Center, 
write us at 4501 LS&A Building, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 48109, or call (313)764-7487. 
355 "The Burdens of Urban History: The Theory of the State in Recent American 
Social History," by Terrence J. McDonald, July 1988, 42 pages. Also CSST 
Working Paper # 5 .  
"Multicultural Organization Developnent," by Bailey Jackson and Evangelina 
Holvino, July 1988, 22 pages. Also P W  Working Paper #11. 
"History, Sociology, and Theories of Organization," by Mayer N. Zald, July 
1988, 33 pages. Also CSST.Working Paper #6. 
"Have Social Historians Lost the Civil War? Some Preliminary Demographic 
Speculations," by Maris A. Vinovskis, July 1988, 46 pages. Also CSST 
Working Paper #7. 
"Innovative Participation in Neighborhood Service Organizations ,jl by Barry 
Checkoway, August 1988, 32 pages. Also P W  Working Paper #12. 
"Facing the Challenge of Diversity and Multiculturalism," by Judith H. Katz, 
Ed.D., Augustl988, 55 pages. Also PCNA Working Paper #13. 
"Changes in Mate Choice in Chengdu," by Martin King Whyte, Septembe,r 1988, 
32 pages. 
"Changing Organizational Racism: A Workshop for University Staff Leaders," 
by Mark Chesler and Cheryl Hyde, October 1988, 68 pages. Also PCNA Working 
Paper #14. 
"Revolution and the Agrarian Bourgeoisie in Nicaragua," by Jeffery M. Paige, 
42 pages. Also CSST Working Paper #8. 
"Psychosocial and Social-Environmental Problems and Needs for Support 
Services of Off-Treatment Survivors of Childhood Cancer," by Mark Chesler, 
October 1988, 87 pages. 
"Nationalism and Class as Factors in the Revolution of 1917," by Ronald G. 
Suny, October 1988, 42 pages. Also CSST Working Paper #9. 
"Organizations, Industry, and the State," by David Jacobs, Michael Useem, 
and Mayer N. Zald, October 1988, 33 pages. 
367 "The Original Caste: Power, History, and Hierarchy in South Asia," by 
Nicholas B. Dirks, October 1988, 30 pages. Also CSST Working Paper #lo. 
368 "The Invention of Caste: Civil Society in Colonial India," by Nicholas B. 
Dirks, October 1988, 24 pages. Also CSST Working Paper #11. 
369 "Sociology as a Discipline: Quasi-Science and Quasi-Humanities," by Mayer 
Zald, October 1988, 43 pages. Also CSST Working Paper #12. 

